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Intra- and Inter-Channel Competition in Local-Service Sectors 
 
Abstract 
Although economically very important, local-service sectors have received little attention in 
the extensive literature on competitive interactions.  Detailed data gathering in these sectors is 
hard, not only because of the multitude of local players, but also because key service 
dimensions are hard to quantify.  Using empirical entry models, we show how to infer 
information on these sectors’ degree of intra- and inter-channel competition from the 
observed entry decisions in different local markets. The approach also controls for relevant 
socio-demographic characteristics of the trading area that may affect performance. 
 We apply the proposed empirical entry model to the video-rental market. Additional 
entries of video stores are found to significantly increase the level of intra-channel 
competition.  Unlike the predictions of many normative economic models, we find this 
increase to be larger when the entry occurs in a duopoly than in a monopoly, a pattern 
consistent with recent experimental research on collusive behavior in oligopolies.  We also 
find evidence of inter-channel cannibalization from the upstream channel (movie theatres), 
but not from the downstream channel (premium cable).  Finally, various socio-demographic 
characteristics of the trading zone, such as income and household size, are found to also have 
a significant impact on store performance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, marketing researchers concentrated on consumer response to marketing 
decision variables. Because of the decline in most Western economies, increasing attention 
became devoted to the behavior of competitors in the marketplace (Leeflang and Wittink, 
1992), as reflected in special issues on competition in the International Journal of Research in 
Marketing (2001) and Marketing Science (2005). Many of the empirical applications in the 
area, however, deal with fast-moving consumer goods (e.g. Leeflang and Wittink, 1992; 
Steenkamp et al., 2005), the car market (Roy, Hanssens and Raju, 1994; Sudhir, 2001) and the 
pharmaceutical industry (Shankar, 1997). Not surprisingly, these are sectors where detailed 
information on performance and support variables tends to be available.1  
In service sectors such as the hotel, restaurant and video-rental industry, however, it is 
difficult to collect data on the different marketing and/or performance variables of all players 
in the market. Firms in these sectors typically compete in local markets, as customers need 
local contact with the service provider (Fuentelsaz, Gomez and Polo, 2002). These so-called 
local-service sectors are economically very important. For example, in 2001, the US and UK 
hotel and restaurant sector contributed respectively 1% ($ 88.4 billion dollar) and 3% (£29 
billion) to Total Gross Value Added (United Nations statistics, 2001). These sectors have 
recently received increasing attention in the marketing literature. The focus, however, has 
remained on the customer side (see e.g. Smith and Bolton, 1999), while the competitor side 
has been largely neglected (see Venkataraman and Kadiyali (2004) for a notable exception).  
Certain characteristics of local-service sectors inhibit the application of traditional 
methods that have been used to make inferences on the competitive structure of a market, 
such as Granger-Causality tests (e.g. Leeflang and Wittink, 1996), the Conjectural Variations 
                                                 
1 Data providers in those sectors are, for example, IRI or A.C. Nielsen for fast-moving consumer goods, Ward’s 
Automotive Handbook for cars, and IMS in the pharmaceutical industry. We refer to Hanssens, Parsons and 
Schultz (2001) for a more extensive discussion on these and other data providers. 
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approach (e.g. Kim and Parker, 1999), and the Non-Nested Model Comparisons approach 
(e.g. Kadiyali, Chintagunta and Vilcassim, 2000). Two key inhibiting factors are (i) the large 
number of local players, and (ii) the existence of difficult-to-observe decision variables.  
First, local-service markets are often fragmented with many local players. The UK 
hotel sector, for example, consists of more than 40,000 establishments, while Germany 
(France) has around 38,000 (20,000) hotels (Eurostat, 2002). Geographic diversification 
decisions are crucial in such industries, as customers expect a local contact with the firm. As 
such, operating in a geographical market necessitates in-market facilities from which to 
deliver the service (Fuentelsaz, Gomez and Polo, 2002). Gathering detailed data on all 
individual market participants is nearly impossible.  
Second, firms in service sectors not only compete on the basis of readily observable 
tactical marketing variables, but also on a number of other, less directly observable, factors 
(Zeithaml and Bitner, 2000). Service marketers have found that the traditional 4 P’s of 
marketing are often inadequate to describe key aspects of their job. Personal interactions with 
employees, physical surroundings, and the flow and progress of the process are also important 
(Rust, Zahorik and Keiningham, 1996). Even though measurement scales have been 
developed to operationalize these components (see e.g. SERVQUAL in Parasuraman, 
Zeithaml and Berry, 1988), it quickly becomes impossible to obtain the relevant measures for 
all players in the market.  
Because of these characteristics of many local-service sectors, we advocate the use of 
another approach to make competitive inferences that has less stringent data requirements. 
The general idea is to infer information on the degree of competition from the observed entry 
decisions, and its relationship with local market size and other market characteristics. Hence, 
to draw inferences on the degree of competition, it is not necessary to observe individual 
firms’ profits. Intuitively, the empirical framework studies by how much the local market size 
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should increase to sustain an additional entrant. If the required market size increase is large, 
this implies that an additional entrant leads to a strong increase in competition. Even though 
the effect of new product entry on market structure has been thoroughly researched in 
marketing (e.g. Pauwels and Srinivasan, 2004; van Heerde, Mela and Manchanda, 2004), little 
attention has been paid to the impact of new outlets on the extent of intra-channel competition 
in local-service sectors, nor to the competitive impact arising from other channels that deliver 
a comparable service.  
We illustrate the proposed framework in the context of the Belgian video-rental 
industry. People tend to patronize a video store that is close to home (Zhu, 2001). As a 
consequence, markets tend to be very local, resulting in a large amount of players in the 
industry. In the US alone, the video-rental industry consists of more than 28,000 video stores 
(Seim, 2001), while also the Belgian sector consists of over 1,000 stores.  
Since the late 1980s, video2 rental and retail (sales) has become the largest source of 
income to the movie industry, creating almost $ 8 billion of worldwide revenues for the major 
film studios in 2000 (Vogel, 2001). Inspite of the economic importance of secondary movie 
markets such as video rental, marketing researchers have focused almost exclusively on the 
movie-theatre channel (see e.g. Elberse and Eliashberg, 2003; Eliashberg et al., 2000; Swami, 
Eliashberg and Weinberg, 1999), largely neglecting the subsequent channels of movie 
distribution (see Lehmann and Weinberg, 2000 and Prasad, Bronnenberg and Mahajan, 2004 
for two notable exceptions).  
Apart from its intrinsic economic importance, an additional interesting feature of the 
video-rental industry is the competition it experiences from other channels of movie 
distribution, such as movie theatres. As a consequence, we also contribute to the growing 
literature on inter-channel competition. Previous studies have concentrated on simultaneous 
                                                 
2 In this paper, the digital video disk (DVD) and videocassette are both referred to as video. 
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distribution channels (e.g. Biyalogorsky and Naik, 2003; Deleersnyder et al., 2002). We 
extend this to sequential distribution channels by measuring the competitive impact of 
channels both upstream and downstream in the movie distribution sequence. 
 
2. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
To study both profit determinants and the role of competition without directly observing 
individual profit, cost, price or other strategic marketing information on the various market 
players, we assume that firms enter a local market as long as this is profitable. Based on this 
assumption, the observed number of firms allows one to infer bounds on the profitability in 
each local market. A similar assumption was made by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) in their 
study on, amongst others, doctors, dentists and druggists. Other studies adopting this 
assumption include Asplund and Sandin (1999), Genesove (2004), Manuszak (2002), and 
Pfann and Van Kranenburg (2003).  
Using the estimated relationship between the observed number of (profitable) entrants 
and the observed market characteristics, one can subsequently derive entry thresholds. An 
entry threshold is defined as the minimum market size required for a given number of firms to 
break even, after controlling for other observed market characteristics, in a market. It is the 
population level at which the expected profitability is equal to zero. Entry thresholds provide 
information on how the extent of competition changes as more firms enter the market. 
Specifically, if an additional entrant provides a strong constraint on firm profits, the entry 
threshold to carry that additional firm raises more than proportionally. For example, if the 
critical market size required to carry one firm consists of 1,000 inhabitants and the market 
size to carry two firms is 3,000 inhabitants, one can infer that the second firm increases the 
degree of competition in that market, as the per-firm threshold has increased. In contrast, if 
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the market size required to support two firms is 2,000, the entry of the second firm did not 
affect the level of competition, as the per-firm threshold did not change.  
 
2.1. Econometric framework 
Firm profits when there are n firms in market i are given by the latent variable ni∏ , which 
consists of an observed component ( niπ ) and an unobserved component ( iε ): 
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The observed component is allowed to depend on the number of firms in the market. The 
unobserved component represents a random part that is specific to market i, but common to 
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with )(⋅Φ  the cumulative standard normal distribution. These probabilities are used to 
construct the likelihood function, which leads to an ordered probit specification. 
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2.2. Specification 
The performance measure niπ  may be modeled as a function of market characteristics. 
Overall store performance has been found to increase with local market potential and buying 
power, and to vary with the level of local competition (Campo et al., 2000). Local market 
potential and buying power are influenced by socio-demographic characteristics, such as the 
market’s population, age distribution and income level (see e.g. Johnson, 1997). As for the 
level of competition, we do not only control for direct competitors, but also for the availability 
of possible substitutes in the environment (Mulhern, Williams and Leone, 1998). In the case 
of video-rental stores, these could, for example, include the presence of movie theatres and/or 
premium cable.3 We therefore specify store performance niπ  in market i as:  
( ) ,SUBST DEMOGR POPln niiini λγβαπ −++=   (4) 
which is subsequently substituted in the various expressions of (3) to arrive at the ordered- 
probit likelihood function. iPOP  is the population in market i, iDEMOGR  is a vector of other 
socio-demographic market characteristics, iSUBST  is a vector capturing the presence of 
possible substitutes in market i, and the parameters nλ  are fixed effects, measuring the impact 
of the number of firms n on performance. In general, a positive difference between nλ  
and 1 −nλ  can be interpreted as evidence that entry has a negative effect on performance. 
The estimated parameters ( )ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ nλγβα provide two types of insights. First, they have 
an interest in their own right, as they allow us to test which factors have a significant impact 
on firm performance. Second, they can also be used to derive entry thresholds, i.e. the 
minimum market sizes required to support a given number of firms. These thresholds offer 
insights on how entry affects the extent of competition. More formally, the n-firm entry 
                                                 
3 Premium-cable providers are allowed to show a movie about a year before regular (cable) television providers 
(Doyle, 2002). Subscribers to this channel pay a fixed per-month subscription rate. 
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threshold ( nS ) is defined by the population level at which the expected value of ni∏  is equal 
to zero. Using (4), the estimate for nS  can be computed as: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−= α
λγβ
ˆ
ˆSUBST ˆDEMOGR ˆexpˆ
n
nS ,   (5) 
where DEMOGR  and SUBST  are the covariates evaluated at their sample mean. As 
discussed earlier, entry thresholds increase disproportionally with the number of firms if entry 
has a substantial impact on firm performance, and increase proportionally if entry does not 
affect firm performance. The entry-threshold ratio )( nR  summarizes this information. It is 
defined as the ratio of the per-firm n-firm entry threshold over the per-firm n-1 entry 
threshold, and can be computed as: 
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If the threshold ratio is above one, the extent of competition increases with the additional 
entry. For example, an estimated threshold ratio of 1.05 means that the per-firm market size 
has to increase by 5% to support an additional firm. Note that the threshold ratios in (6) only 
depend on the fixed entry effects nλ  and on the market size parameter α . Although they do 
not directly depend on the other market characteristics, they do so indirectly as the parameter 
estimates of nλ  and α  may be affected by their inclusion in the model.  
Some additional remarks on specification (4) are in order. First, population could, of 
course, be viewed as one additional element of the vector of socio-demographic 
characteristics iDEMOGR . However, we write it separately since it is used to compute the 
entry thresholds, which summarize the role of competition. Second, population enters in 
logarithmic form. This ensures that the computed entry thresholds are non-negative. In 
addition, the logarithmic functional form is consistent with a specification in which the 
drivers of store performance influence the ratio of variable profits over fixed costs, as in 
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Genesove (2004). It is therefore not necessary to separately identify the effects of market 
characteristics on variable profits versus fixed costs as in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), which 
in practice proves to be difficult. Third, unlike previous empirical entry models, such as 
Asplund and Sandin (1999), Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Manuszak (2002), our inclusion 
of iSUBST  allows us to measure, in addition to intra-channel competition, competition 
arising from other channels that deliver similar services.  
 
3. CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
In line with previous research, we argue that overall store performance varies with (i) the 
level of local competition, and (ii) local market potential and buying power.  
 
3.1. Competition 
The competitive character of the trading area may strongly affect a store’s performance 
(Campo et al., 2000; Hoch et al., 1995; Montgomery, 1997). However, the level of local 
competition may not only be influenced by the number of direct competitors (in our case, 
other video stores), but also by the availability of possible substitutes in the environment 
(Mulhern, Williams and Leone, 1998), such as movie theatres and premium cable.  
 
3.1.1. Intra-channel competition 
The extent of competition has often been operationalized through concentration indices such 
as the combined market share of the top players in the market (see e.g. Gielens and 
Steenkamp, 2004) or the Herfindahl Index (see e.g. Bronnenberg and Mela, 2004).  In local-
service industries, however, market-share information on the various incumbents is often 
unavailable (see Section 1).   
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Other studies have used the number of market players as a proxy for the extent of 
competition/market structure (see e.g. Dhar and Hoch, 1997; Nijs et al., 2001).  However, the 
assumed exogeneity of the market-structure variables in those studies can be questioned. 
Market structure not only influences conduct and performance. Conduct can, in turn, affect 
market structure (Kadiyali, Sudhir and Rao, 2001).  An observed market structure is then seen 
as the outcome of firms’ profit-maximizing decisions that take the expected behavior and 
performance of incumbent and potential players into account (Manuszak, 2002). Our 
approach addresses this concern. Market structure is treated as an endogenous variable, as 
determined through the zero-profit market equilibrium. Through the evolution in the 
aforementioned threshold ratios, we are subsequently able to quantify how the extent of 
competition changes when a new player enters various existing market structures (monopoly, 
duopoly,…).   
Different patterns for this evolution may be obtained.  Both the Cournot and the 
differentiated Bertrand model predict the increase in competition to be largest when entry 
occurs in a monopoly market (Tirole, 1988).  Competition will then continue to increase with 
new entrants, albeit at a diminishing rate, until the market has become perfectly competitive, 
i.e. until price-cost margins have become equal to zero.  According to these models, estimated 
threshold ratios will be greater than one, but decrease as more players enter the market until 
the market has become perfectly competitive, in which case the estimated threshold ratio will 
be equal to one. In the Bertrand model with undifferentiated products, in contrast, new 
entrants do not increase the extent of competition as soon as two firms are already active 
(Cabral, 2000). In this model, only the first estimated threshold ratio will thus be significantly 
larger than one. Third, in contestable markets, the competitive effect of entry is already zero 
for entries into monopoly markets.  Indeed, in these markets, the threat of potential entrants is 
already effective in disciplining the incumbent firm, decreasing its price-cost margin already 
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before entry (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982). Actual entry will therefore not increase the 
extent of competition, implying that all estimated threshold ratios for contestable markets will 
be equal to one. Also in markets with sustainable collusion (e.g. d’Aspremenont and 
Gabszewicz, 1985), the effect of entry on the extent of competition in the market will be zero, 
as long as the entry does not cause the collusion to break down.  Estimated threshold ratios for 
collusive markets should thus be equal to one. 
Hence, different model assumptions lead to differing normative implications, making 
the actual evolution of the entry thresholds an empirical issue.   
 
3.1.2. Inter-channel competition 
In recent years, the use of multiple distribution channels has become the rule rather than the 
exception (Frazier, 1999). Still, empirical research on the performance implications of having 
multiple channels is rare.  Notable exceptions are some recent studies on the potential 
cannibalization effects of adding an Internet channel to one’s channel portfolio (see e.g. 
Biyalogorsky and Naik, 2003; Deleersnyder et al., 2002). However, these studies considered 
the simultaneous distribution of a product across multiple channels, where the extent of 
cannibalization may well be different from instances where the distribution coverage is 
gradually extended. Fashion houses, for example, introduce designs sequentially into lower-
priced outlets (Pesendorfer, 1995). In the movie industry, a typical release sequence starts 
with the theatrical release, followed by a short pay-per-view window after 4-6 months, and a 
home-video release after 6-9 months. A movie, on average, becomes available through the 
premium-cable channel approximately 12 months after the first theatrical release, and through 
the regular television channel after another 12 months (Doyle, 2002).  
Even though some minor modifications to the product may be made in the process, the 
main differences have to do with the timing, the choice of distribution channel and the price 
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(Lehmann  and Weinberg, 2000), as margins often decrease as products are offered through 
channels down the sequence (see also Prasad, Bronnenberg and Mahajan, 2004).  Different 
versions of the same product can be considered substitutes, causing possible cannibalization 
from channels upstream and downstream in the sequence.  Indeed, potential customers may 
already have purchased the product (in our setting, seen the movie) in an earlier channel, and 
subsequently leave the market (Lehmann and Weinberg, 2000), while others may have an 
incentive to postpone their purchase as they anticipate a price decrease (Purohit, 1997).  If 
these phenomena, which so far have been documented at the individual product (movie) level, 
occur consistently across multiple products (movies), the overall performance of the 
intermediate channel (the video stores) will be affected negatively by the presence of the 
upstream (movie theatres) and downstream (premium cable) channel. 
 
3.2. Socio-demographic control variables 
Apart from intra- and inter-channel competition, various socio-demographic characteristics of 
the trading zone may also have an impact on the profitability of firms operating in a given 
market (Campo et al., 2000).  We control for the following characteristics: average income 
and household size, the age and ethnic composition of the population, and the degree of 
urbanization of the local market.  
Income As it has a positive impact on purchasing power, income in a local 
market may have a positive effect on the profitability of the various firms in that trading zone.  
On the other hand, as high-income families are also less price sensitive (see e.g. Montgomery, 
1997), income may cause a shift in demand towards the more expensive channels.  Vogel 
(2001) estimates that watching a rented home video is approximately seven times cheaper (per 
person per hour) than a movie-theatre visit, and somewhat more expensive than watching it on 
premium cable.  Of course, each of these options is more expensive than watching regular 
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television.  As video rental is neither the most expensive nor the cheapest option, the net 
effect of these opposing forces is hard to predict.  In addition, wealthy people usually have 
higher opportunity costs (Hoch et al., 1995), which may influence their valuation of time and 
their sensitivity to services offered within the different channels of movie distribution. 
Household size Larger families have been found to be more price sensitive 
(Hoch et al., 1995), which may affect the share of a movie distribution channel relative to 
both the more (upstream) and less (downstream) expensive channels in the sequence, even 
though the net effect is again hard to predict.  Larger families may also be characterized by a 
higher heterogeneity in preferences (Seetharaman and Chintagunta, 1998), which may 
translate in the purchase of multiple products (Gielens and Steenkamp, 2004). 
Age Even though retired people have more leisure time, they have been found  to 
spend less on entertainment than younger people (Vogel, 2001), and to be more price-elastic 
(Boatwright, Dhar and Rossi, 2004), which may affect their channel choice for movie 
entertainment. 
Ethnicity Different ethnic groups have been found to differ in their price elasticity 
(Hoch et al., 1995), which may (as argued before) affect their demand for high- versus low-
cost forms of entertainment.  In addition, minority groups often tend to participate less in 
mainstream leisure activities because of differences in economic resources, value systems, 
norms and socialization patterns (see e.g. Floyd et al., 1994). 
Urbanization We also include the level of urbanization as control variable, as this has 
been shown to affect shopping behavior (e.g. Gatignon, Eiashberg and Robertson, 1989; 
Gielens and Steenkamp, 2004) and hence, store performance.  
 
4. DATA AND INDUSTRY 
4.1. The Video Rental Market 
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The movie industry does not only derive revenue from theatrical exhibition, but also from 
home videos, premium cable, and other television channels (Vogel, 2001). Recently, the 
home-video channel surpassed the movie-theatre industry as most important source of 
consumer spending on movies. In 2002, for example, US consumers spent more than $22 
billion on video and DVD rental ($ 10 bn) and buying ($12 bn) compared to almost $10 
billion on theatre tickets (IVF, 2003; MPA, 2003). Also in Western Europe, consumers spend 
a considerable amount on home video, reaching almost $12 billion in 2002 (IVF, 2003).  
We concentrate on the Belgian market, which is representative for Western Europe in 
terms of various macro-economic indicators (GDP/capita and wholesale, retail trade, 
restaurants and hotels as % of GDP), and, even more importantly, on several key 
characteristics of the video-rental business, such as VCR and DVD penetration, average 
spending on video rental, the average number of rental transactions per TV household, and the 
average rental charge (see Table 1).  
[Table 1 goes about here] 
The video-rental sector has limited entry and exit barriers (Gomery, 1993) which further 
justifies our assumption that video stores enter as long as this is profitable. 
 
4.2. Data description 
4.2.1. Sample composition 
Our sample consists of all active video stores in 2003 (1,275 in total) in 2,576 Belgian local 
markets. We define local markets at the level of “townships”. Townships used to form 
separate juridical entities. In the late seventies, several of them were merged with each other 
to form larger “municipalities”. The smaller level of aggregation is selected because of two 
reasons. First, local markets should be self-contained in that there is no relevant direct 
competition coming from outside the defined market (Abraham, Gaynor and Vogt, 2003). 
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Second, townships still have their own community centre, around which several stores tend to 
cluster and which people still visit for many of their day-to-day (grocery) purchases. As 
customers have been found to primarily rent their videos from a store close to their home4 
(Zhu, 2001), which reflects the typical need for local contacts in service encounters, the 
smaller level of aggregation is more appropriate. Following Asplund and Sandin (1999), we 
exclude all townships of the largest Belgian cities from our sample. As such, we exclude all 
townships of the 18 largest cities (e.g. Antwerp, Ghent and Liege) in Belgium (i.e. 167 
townships), as well as the 19 municipalities that constitute Brussels. These townships were 
found to be five times larger than the rest in terms of population, and therefore could consist 
of multiple local markets. In total, we have 2,390 or 93% of all townships left for analysis, 
with an average population size of around 3,000. To control for potentially relevant cultural 
and economic differences between the two main Belgian regions, i.e. the Dutch-speaking 
Northern part (Flanders) and the French-speaking Southern part (Wallonia), we also include 
an additional region dummy variable. 
 
4.2.2. Dependent variable 
Data on the number of video stores operating in each local market (township) was obtained 
from a specialized data provider, which derived the information primarily from the Yellow 
Pages. Information from the Yellow Pages was also used to identify the relevant stores in a 
trading zone by Campo et al. (2000), Mortimer (2004) and Seim (2001), among others. These 
data were extensively cross-validated (and in a limited number of instances, extended) with 
addresses obtained from the websites of Belgian video-store chains, contacts with film 
distributors, and field research. Summary statistics on the relative occurrence of various 
market structures are given in Table 2. A majority of the townships (80%) does not have a 
                                                 
4 In this setting, the limited distance to a local video store is even more relevant, as each interaction requires two 
contacts (renting plus returning of the video).  
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local video store, while other market structures reflect a monopoly or duopoly situation (276 
and 120 cases, respectively). There are 40 local markets with three stores and 33 markets with 
more than three stores. As there are few observations with more than four videos stores, we 
combine these observations in a single 4+ category. A similar practice was adopted in 
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Manuszak (2002). 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
4.2.3. Explanatory variables 
Data on the local markets’ demographic characteristics was obtained through the Belgian 
National Institute of Statistics (NIS). Some of the information was only available at a higher 
level of aggregation (e.g. municipality or ZIP-code level), in which case the corresponding 
value was assigned to each local market in that municipality or ZIP-code area (see Bresnahan 
and Reiss (1991) or Manuszak (2002) for a similar practice). 
Following Genesove (2004), we measure the population size of a trading zone through 
the log of its number of inhabitants (in 1,000). As in Macé and Neslin (2004) and Pfann and 
Van Kranenburg (2003), we operationalize household size as the average number of people 
per household (based on per-municipality data).  Income information was obtained from per-
municipality tax-declaration data.  In line with Gijsbrechts, Campo and Goossens (2003), we 
measure a market’s income distribution through two variables, capturing the percentage of tax 
declarations with a low (i.e. <$ 13,400) and high (i.e. > $ 26,800) net income. These cut-off 
values are driven by the income classes reported by the Belgian NIS. Census information is 
used to derive the age and ethnic composition of the different local markets.  Following 
Abraham, Gaynor and Vogt (2003) and Campo et al. (2000), we proxy age by the percentage 
of people older than 64 years.  The ethnic composition of the market is operationalized as the 
percentage of foreigners living in a given local market.  In line with Campo et al. (2000), we 
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constructed, using a typology proposed in Van Hecke (1998), a dummy variable to identify 
highly urbanized areas.5 Finally, a dummy variable is included to indicate whether the 
considered township is located in Flanders. 
To quantify the extent of inter-channel competition, two additional variables are 
introduced.  First, we construct a dummy variable indicating whether a movie theatre is 
situated in a municipality within 7 miles of the center of the municipality to which a given 
township belongs on the basis of data provided by the NIS.  The seven-mile cutoff value is 
based on industry reports which indicate that moviegoers are, on average, willing to travel 7 
miles to go to a movie theatre (Newspaper Society, 2000).6  Information on the extent of 
competition from premium cable (at the zipcode level) was only available for Wallonia, the 
Southern part of the country. The variable was operationalized as the percentage of 
households in the zipcode with a premium-cable subscription. Data were provided by Canal+ 
Wallonia, the only provider of premium cable in the region. Summary statistics on the various 
explanatory variables are given in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 4 presents the parameter estimates based on the ordered probit model as outlined in 
Section 2. Calculated Variance Inflation Factors were all well below the critical threshold of 
10, indicating that there was no serious multicollinearity problem (Gujarati, 1995). The first 
two columns focus on the effects of intra-channel competition and upward inter-channel 
competition (movie theatres), with and without accounting for socio-demographics.  These 
specifications are based on the full sample, i.e. both the region of Flanders and Wallonia. The 
                                                 
5 Van Hecke (1998) classifies Belgian municipalities on the basis of degree of equipment (e.g. schools, 
transportation, hospitals). Three types of municipalities are considered to have a high degree of urbanization: 
large, regional and small cities. 
6 Results, not reported here, show that the findings on inter-channel competition hold with deviations of one mile 
above and below this cutoff point.  
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third column presents the results from a specification that also considers the role of downward 
inter-channel competition (premium cable). Since information on premium-cable 
subscriptions was not available for Flanders, the estimates in the third column are based on 
the sample for Wallonia only. Table 5 subsequently presents the estimated entry thresholds 
and threshold ratios implied by the estimates of the three specifications in Table 4. 
 [Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
 
5.1. Intra-channel competition 
To discuss our findings on intra-channel competition, i.e. competition between videos stores 
in the same local market, we first discuss the results of specification (1), which is based on the 
full sample, excluding the demographic information. We subsequently address the robustness 
of our findings when socio-demographic information is included. 
As mentioned in section 2.2, the estimated fixed effects nλ  measure the impact of 
competition on firm performance. As indicated earlier, a positive difference between nλ  
and 1 −nλ  can be interpreted as evidence that entry has a negative effect on performance. The 
results show that the differences are always positive. For example, the difference between 2 λ  
and 1 λ  is 2.92 – 1.91=1.01. To better interpret the parameters, we turn to the more 
informative competition measures, i.e. the entry thresholds nS and implied entry-threshold 
ratios nR , which are computed from the nλ ; see equations (5) and (6) and the earlier 
discussion in section 2.1.. The first panel in Table 5 shows the entry-threshold levels nS  
(computed for an average market). Specification (1) implies that a monopolist needs a market 
size of approximately 5,100 inhabitants to break even. The break-even market sizes for a 
duopoly, and markets with three and four or more firms are, respectively, around 11,600, 
22,900 and 37,700.  This shows that market size needs to increase disproportionally to support 
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additional entry, suggesting that intra-channel competition is indeed a constraint on firm 
performance. 
The entry-threshold ratios nR  show this more accurately. The entry-threshold ratio for 
a duopoly relative to a monopoly is equal to 1.13. In words, this says that the per-firm 
minimum required market size to support a duopoly market structure is 13% larger than the 
market size required to support a monopoly. The entry-threshold ratios for subsequent entry 
are respectively 1.31 and 1.24: the per-firm market size should increase by an additional 31% 
to support three firms, and by an additional 24% to support four or more firms. Wald tests 
confirm that the ratios are all significantly above one. Hence, we find that intra-channel 
competition has a significant negative effect on firm performance. For the smaller market 
structures, these findings on the effects of entry on competition are in line with Asplund and 
Sandin (1999), Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), and Manuszak (2002). However, in contrast to 
Asplund and Sandin (1999) and Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), we still find threshold ratios 
significantly above one for the larger market structures, indicating that additional entry in 
markets which already have three stores still increases the extent of competition. Our findings 
imply that the models of contestable markets (in which a monopoly is sufficient for perfect 
competition) or of perfectly sustainable collusion can be rejected. In addition, the Bertrand 
model with homogeneous products can also be rejected (since that model would imply that all 
the effects of entry on competition would take place upon entry in a monopoly market). 
The observed pattern of the entry-threshold ratios gives interesting additional findings. 
We tested whether the consecutive per-firm entry-threshold ratios differ significantly from 
each other, i.e. whether nn RR =−1 .  As shown in the third panel of Table 5, the first entry-
threshold ratio 2R  is significantly smaller than 3R  ( 2χ (1) = 4.29, p = 0.04), implying that a 
shift from monopoly to duopoly has a lower impact on competition than a shift to a market 
structure with three firms. The third and fourth ratios do not differ significantly from each 
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other ( 2χ  (1) = 0.34, p = 0.56). This pattern is inconsistent with traditional models of 
oligopolistic competition, such as the Cournot model or Bertrand model with differentiated 
products, which have the property of smoothly declining entry-threshold ratios. The pattern is, 
however, consistent with models with imperfectly sustainable collusion. Recent experimental  
research by Huck, Normann and Oechssler (2004) has shown that collusion can be sustained 
in a duopoly, while it is never observed in market structures with more firms, thereby 
confirming the general belief that cooperative behavior should be expected in small groups, 
whereas in large groups non-cooperative behavior should prevail. Our estimated threshold 
ratios are consistent with this pattern, since the entry-threshold ratio is largest when shifting 
from a duopoly market to a market with three firms (ratio = 1.31). 
Our main findings on intra-channel competition, as summarized by the entry-threshold 
ratios nR , remain very robust in the second specification, which includes the socio-
demographic variables. Indeed, even though the socio-demographic control variables 
somewhat affect the estimated threshold values (i.e. the nS ), the threshold ratios (i.e. the nR ), 
which are central to our inferences on the extent of competition, are very robust across 
specifications.  
 
5.2. Upward inter-channel competition 
Specification (1) in Table 4 shows that the presence of competition from an upward channel, 
i.e. a nearby movie theatre, has a significantly negative impact on the performance of video 
stores (point estimate of Theatreγ  is –0.17, p = 0.03). Our results on the competitive impact 
from the upstream channel extends previous work by Lehmann and Weinberg (2000).  They 
found cannibalization effects from earlier theatre visits on the subsequent rental performance 
of the same movie.  Our results show that the cannibalization effect of movie theatres extends 
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beyond this direct (same-movie) effect, and affects the overall performance of video stores in 
the theatre’s trading zone as well. 
To better interpret the extent of inter-channel competition, one may compute the entry-
threshold levels nS separately for markets with and without a movie theatre.7 The 
computations show that the market size required to support a monopoly video store when a 
movie theatre is present is equal to 5,331 inhabitants as opposed to 4,659 when this is not the 
case. Similarly, the market size required to support a duopoly when a movie theatre is present 
is equal to 12,076 inhabitants, and 10,554 if this is not the case.  
Finally, one can also re-interpret the movie-theatre parameter Theatreγ  more compactly 
as the percentage market-size increase required for a particular number of firms to break even 
when there is inter-channel competition (independent of whether inter-channel competition 
occurs in a monopoly, duopoly or otherwise). The parameter estimate of -0.17 implies that the 
percentage market-size increase required to support any market structure in the presence of 
inter-channel competition is 14%.8 We can compare this with our previous findings on intra-
channel competition: inter-channel competition appears to have a comparable percentage 
effect on firm performance as a shift from monopoly to duopoly (which was 13%), but a 
lower effect than shifts to market structures with more competition. In this sense, the impact 
of inter-channel competition is as strong as the impact of intra-channel competition in a 
duopoly market, but weaker than the additional impact of a new entrant in less concentrated 
markets. 
Note that also the effect of upward inter-channel competition is robust in the second 
specification, which includes socio-demographic variables. 
                                                 
7 Our estimates of threshold values nS in Table 5 were based on a representative average market, with an 
average movie theatre presence equal to 0.72. Our calculations in this paragraph separately distinguish between 
markets with and without a movie theatre. 
8 This can be derived by computing the ratio of threshold values nS with and without a movie theatre. It is 
straightforward to derive that this ratio is given by 14.1)24.1/17.0exp()ˆ/ˆexp( ==− αγ . 
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5.3. Downward inter-channel competition 
Next, we consider the impact of downward inter-channel competition, i.e. competition 
between the video stores and channels lower in the distribution chain. As discussed in section 
3.1.2., video stores possibly face downward inter-channel competition from premium cable. 
We assessed the impact of premium cable on video-store performance using the Wallonia 
sample (n = 1,338) only, since data on the number of subscriptions to premium cable was only 
available for this region. The third specification in Tables 4 and 5 shows the results. It is the 
analogue of the second specification, but estimated on the limited sample of Wallonia only. 
Before discussing the role of downward inter-channel competition, note that the other results 
regarding intra-channel and upward inter-channel competition are essentially robust. 
Regarding intra-channel competition, the threshold ratios are usually still significantly above 
one.9  Furthermore, the threshold ratio for adding a second store 2R  is again significantly 
below the entry threshold for adding a third store 3R  ( 2χ (1) = 2.87, p = 0.09), consistent 
with our explanation that collusion may be more difficult to sustain from the third store 
onwards. Finally, it is still the case that 3R  is not significantly different from 4R  ( 2χ (1) = 
0.19, p = 0.66). Regarding upward inter-channel competition, the point estimate for the 
presence of a video store is very similar (-0.16 instead of –0.17). The standard error becomes 
larger (due to the more limited number of observations), but significance still holds at the 
10% level (p = 0.10). 
 For the role of downward inter-channel competition, we look at the parameter 
estimate for premium cable. We find that the percentage of households with a subscription to 
premium cable does not have a significant effect on the performance of video stores (point 
                                                 
9 The only exception is the entry-threshold ratio when shifting from monopoly to duopoly. This threshold is still 
above one, though not significantly so. This can, however, be attributed to the lower number of observations in 
the limited Wallonia sample. 
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estimate of 1.01, p = 0.45). Hence, there appears to be no cannibalization by the downward 
distribution channel, in contrast with our finding on the upward distribution channel.  
Our findings on inter-channel competition extend Lehmann and Weinberg’s (2000) 
argumentation that customers that have already bought the product may subsequently leave 
the market, resulting in downward cannibalization. On the other hand, the absence of an effect 
from the downstream channel (premium cable), shows that customers do not postpone their 
purchase in anticipation of a price decrease, as was suggested by Purohit (1997). This is a 
reassuring finding for movie studios, as their margin is largest for channels highest in the 
sequence (Doyle, 2002). 
 
5.4. Socio-demographic control variables 
Specification (2), for the full sample, and specification (3), for Wallonia only, include socio-
demographic variables. As indicated before, their inclusion did not affect our substantive 
implications on the nature of intra- and inter-channel competition.  
In line with earlier findings from the micro-marketing literature (e.g. Campo et al., 
2000; Hoch et al., 1995, and Montgomery, 1997), we find that socio-demographic variables 
have an important effect on store profit. Specification (2) in Table 4 shows that the addition of 
socio-demographic variables increases the model fit (pseudo R² of 0.39 instead of 0.37 in the 
first specification). A likelihood-ratio test shows a highly significant joint effect of the socio-
demographic variables (p < 0.001). Specification (3), for the sample of Wallonia only, again 
shows that the fit increases when socio-demographic variables are included. A likelihood-
ratio test confirms that the demographics are again jointly significant (p = 0.003).  
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We base our discussion regarding the socio-demographic variables on specification 
(2).10 The effect of income appears to be dual. Both markets with many low-income families 
and markets with many high-income families are associated with a significantly lower video-
store performance, as compared to markets with more intermediate-income families (p = 0.01 
and 0.05, respectively). For families at the lower tail of the income distribution, the traditional 
income effect may hold: they may have to cut back on entertainment and spend their income 
on necessary goods. For the higher incomes, the substitution effect comes into play. They may 
spend their budget on more expensive forms of entertainment. The latter finding is in line 
with recent industry reports that conclude that high-income segments have a lower propensity 
to rent videos (VSDA, 1998). 
Larger families appear to spend more on video rental (p = 0.03). As larger families are 
typically families with children, this result is consistent with industry reports that found that 
families with children rent far more videos than other households (VSDA, 1998). The 
percentage of foreigners in a market has a negative influence on video-store profit (p = 0.02). 
This confirms our prior argumentation that foreigners may face economic, cultural or 
linguistic barriers that prevent them from renting videos. Elderly increase the profitability of a 
video store, as is indicated by the significant positive effect of the percentage of older people 
(p < 0.001), which may be explained by their typically larger amount of leisure time (Vogel, 
2001). In line with the findings of industry reports (VSDA, 1998), people in urban 
surroundings rent more videos, thereby increasing video-store profitability (p = 0.02). Finally, 
also regional differences turn out to be important, as the parameter associated with this 
control variable was highly significant (p < 0.001).  
                                                 
10 Most of these findings are robust when only the results for the limited sample of Wallonia are considered, 
even though some of the demographic effects become insignificant due to the reduced number of observations. 
Specifically, the effect of age and the degree of urbanization remain significant, while both the effects of 
household size and the percentage of foreigners are comparable in sign and size to the results from the larger 
sample.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Local-service sectors have been largely neglected in the widely-studied field of competitive 
interactions. This may be attributed to the fact that detailed data gathering in these sectors is 
typically difficult because of the multitude of players, and the fact that key service 
components are hard to quantify. An empirical entry model is proposed to study competition 
in local-service sectors by inferring information on the profitability and the degree of 
competition from the observed entry decisions of firms in local markets. This approach, which 
imposes very few data demands, does not only allow us to infer information on the relative 
degree of intra-channel competition in different market structures, but also to measure the 
effect of up- and downstream inter-channel competition, as well as of various socio-
demographic factors, on a service store’s performance. 
In our application on the Belgian video-rental market, we find that intra-channel 
competition increases with every entry. However, contrary to predictions from most 
traditional economic models, we find that this increase is larger when entry occurs in a 
duopoly than in a monopoly.  The observed pattern is consistent, however, with recent 
experimental research on collusion in oligopolies by Huck, Normann and Oechssler (2004). 
Moreover, we also find evidence for inter-channel competition from the upstream channel 
(movie theatre). Premium cable, on the other hand, does not impact video-store performance 
significantly. In line with the micro-marketing literature, we also find that socio-demographic 
characteristics of the local market have an important effect on store performance. Specifically, 
we find that the percentage of both low-income and high-income families have a negative 
effect on video-store performance. Also the percentage of foreigners was found to influence 
video-store performance negatively. Larger families and families in urban surroundings, on 
the other hand, are found to rent more movies. 
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 Our framework allows us to infer the nature of competition in local-service markets 
without very stringent data requirements.  In so doing, some implicit assumptions were made 
which could be relaxed in future research.  First, firms in a given market are assumed to be 
homogeneous.  Despite the fact that video stores offer a relatively homogenous product, store 
organization as well as economies of scale in inventory management and/or advertising could 
result in different demand and cost structures between independent and chain-affiliated video 
stores (Seim 2001).  However, our homogeneity assumption may still hold in most European 
countries where video chains are limited in size (number of stores). In Belgium, for example, 
the largest chain has only 60 stores, which is hardly comparable to American chains as 
Blockbusters and Hollywood Entertainment with, respectively, 5,000 and 1,800 video stores 
(Seim, 2001). Still, more research is needed to relax this assumption when chains get larger. 
In principle, one could follow the approach of Mazzeo (2002) and explicitly account for 
different types of video stores (independent versus chain-affiliated stores). For this particular 
application, however, this did not provide a feasible option, as very few stores belong to a 
chain (only 8% of all Belgian video stores). This would imply very limited variation across 
different market structure combinations (as defined by the number of stores of each type). 
Second, the various markets in our sample are assumed to be non-overlapping. To that extent, 
we omitted larger cities from our sample, and focused on townships, rather than the larger 
municipalities, as relevant geographical entity.  However, some overlap may still exist in a 
number of instances; for example, when transient shoppers patronize video stores on their 
route to work rather than in their home’s township (Gijsbrechts, Campo and Goossens, 2003).  
To mitigate this effect, one could follow Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), and include socio-
demographic characteristics of the neighboring townships as additional control variables in 
Equation (4).  Third, the nature of competition is inferred under a steady-state, equilibrium, 
condition.  Even though this assumption may be reasonable for mature industries as the video-
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rental sector, the nature of competition may, in some instances, evolve over time (see e.g. 
Sudhir, Chintagunta and Kadiyali, 2005).  Such time variation cannot be inferred from a one-
shot analysis. 
 Another avenue for future research involves the application of our framework to 
other countries and/or other local-service sectors (s.a. restaurants and hotels), which would 
allow to see whether some of our substantive implications on the nature of both intra- and 
inter-channel competition are idiosyncratic to this specific setting, or form the onset of 
empirical generalizations. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Belgium with Western Europe  
 Belgium 
Western 
Europe(c) 
Macro-economic indicators   
GDP/capita (2002, $)(a) 23,768 23,285 
 
Wholesale, retail trade, restaurants, hotels as % of GDP (2002)(a) 12% 13% 
 
Video-rental statistics   
VCR penetration (2002, % of TV households)(b) 79% 79% 
 
DVD-player penetration (2002, % of TV households)(b) 17% 18% 
 
Spending on video rental per TV household (2002, $)(b) 21 18 
 
Number of rental transactions per TV household (2002)(b) 6 5 
 
Average rental charges (2002, $)(b) 3.2 3.6 
 
(a) United Nations Statistics.  
(b) Own calculations based on numbers from the European Video Yearbook 2003, published by the 
International Video Federation (IVF).  
(c) Following the IVF, we define Western Europe as the 15 countries of the European Union at the end of 
2000, together with Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Number of observations per market structure 
Video Stores in Market 
 
Number of Local Markets (percentage) 
 
0 1,921  (80%) 
1 276  (12%) 
2 120  (5%) 
3 40  (2%) 
4+ 33  (1%)  
Total 2,390 (100%)  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
Number of 
observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Inter-channel competition      
(Movie) Theatre 2,390 72%(a)    
Premium Cable 1,338(b) 19% 5% 0% 35% 
      
Socio-demographic characteristics     
Population 2,390 3,030 4,433 14 41,481 
Low Income 2,390 23% 4% 15% 37% 
High Income 2,390 27% 5% 14% 42% 
Household size 2,390 2.49 0.14 2.03 2.93 
Age 2,390 16% 3% 7% 37% 
Ethnicity 2,390 4% 5% 0% 59% 
Urbanization 2,390 21%(a)    
Region 2,390 43%(a)    
(a) Dummy variables. We report the proportion of observations having the value 1. 
(b) Information on premium-cable subscriptions applies only to townships in Wallonia. In addition, data were missing for 22 Walloon townships. 
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Table 4: Estimated parameters of expected-profit functions(a) 
Coefficient Specification 
 (1) (2) (3) 
αlog(Population) 1.24*** 
(0.05) 
1.39*** 
(0.05) 
1.18*** 
(0.07) 
λ1 1.91*** 
(0.09) 
3.13*** 
(1.09) 
4.85*** 
(1.56) 
λ2 2.92*** 
(0.11) 
4.19*** 
(1.10) 
5.80*** 
(1.56) 
λ3 3.76*** 
(0.13) 
5.08*** 
(1.10) 
6.65*** 
(1.57) 
λ4 4.38*** 
(0.15) 
5.74*** 
(1.10) 
7.45*** 
(1.58) 
γTheatre  -0.17** 
(0.09) 
-0.17** 
(0.09) 
-0.16* 
(0.13) 
γPremium Cable    -   - 1.01 (1.33) 
βHousehold size    - 0.78** (0.35) 0.72 (0.56) 
βLow Income    - -3.58*** (1.42) -0.58 (1.83) 
βHigh Income    - -2.10** (1.06) 0.20 (1.70) 
βAge   - 5.48*** (1.48) 8.23*** (1.99) 
βEthnicity   - -1.63** (0.70) -0.41 (1.04) 
βUrbanization    - 0.22** (0.09) 0.27** (0.14) 
βRegion    - -0.67*** (0.10)   - 
    
Pseudo R² 0.37 0.39 0.36 
Number of observations 2,390 2,390 1,338 
(a) Standard errors between parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate a significant result at, respectively, 10%, 5% and 
1% significance level. Reported significance tests are two-tailed, except for the effect of movie-theatre presence.
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Table 5: Estimated threshold values (Sn) and ratios (Rn) 
Variable Specification 
    (1)    (2)    (3) 
    
Threshold values   
S1 5,133 4,638 4,386 
S2 11,628 9,969 9,829 
S3 22,877 18,922 20,106 
S4 37,708 30,597 39,744 
   
Threshold ratios(a)   
R2 
 
1.13*** 
(6.85) 
1.07* 
(2.67) 
1.12 
(2.03) 
R3 
 
1.31*** 
(17.35) 
1.27*** 
(14.91) 
1.36*** 
(6.87) 
R4 
 
1.24*** 
(6.82) 
1.21*** 
(6.21) 
1.48** 
(4.07) 
  
Test on ratios(b)  
R2 = R3 
 
4.29** 6.12*** 2.87* 
R3 = R4 
  
0.34 0.19 0.19 
(a) Numbers between parentheses are the Wald test statistics for the null hypothesis that the ratio equals one. 
*,**,*** indicate significant effects at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
(b) Numbers are the Wald test statistics for the null hypothesis that two consecutive ratios are equal to each 
other. *,**,*** indicate significant differences at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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